As of June 23, 2025, Iran has begun retaliating against the United States following unprecedented U.S. strikes on its nuclear facilities. So far, Iran’s responses have included missile attacks on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, parliamentary approval to close the Strait of Hormuz, activation of Houthi proxies in Yemen, continued missile strikes on Israel, and warnings of cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure.
U.S. intelligence agencies are also monitoring the threat of radiological dispersal devices, commonly known as dirty bombs, and the largely mythical concern over portable “suitcase” nukes. While Iran has shown it possesses conventional military capabilities and economic leverage, radiological terrorism represents a different kind of threat.
Intelligence assessments warn of a “heightened threat environment” but note that Iran’s responses so far remain conventional. This analysis evaluates the technical realities, Iran’s actual capabilities, and strategic limits regarding radiological weapons, separating fact from myth.
A dirty bomb, or Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), is a conventional explosive paired with radioactive material. When detonated, it spreads radiation over the surrounding area. Crucially, an RDD is not a nuclear weapon and cannot cause an atomic explosion.
Most RDDs would not release enough radiation to kill or severely sicken people. The blast from the explosive itself would pose a greater danger than the radiation. Only those very close to the site would face significant health risks.
Rather than a “Weapon of Mass Destruction,” an RDD is better understood as a “Weapon of Mass Disruption,” intended to incite panic and economic chaos. Its physical damage and radiation spread are limited by the size of the explosive. While a nuclear bomb disperses radiation over tens or hundreds of square miles, an RDD typically contaminates only a few city blocks. Though some radioactive particles might drift further, they rapidly lose concentration and danger with distance.
Modeling shows that radiation from a typical dirty bomb would spread in a cylinder about 30 meters high and 150 meters wide, again, affecting only a few blocks under normal conditions.
The impact depends on factors like explosive size, type and quantity of radioactive material, dispersal method, and weather. Most of the radioactive content may burn off during the explosion, further limiting its health effects.
The first recorded attempt at radiological terrorism came when Chechen separatists planted a radioactive canister in a Moscow park as a publicity stunt. It was never detonated and not part of an actual RDD. Iraq also tested a one-ton radiological bomb in 1987 but abandoned the effort when it failed to produce deadly radiation levels, highlighting the technical challenges in weaponizing radioactive materials.
Another frequently discussed nuclear terrorism threat is the so-called suitcase nuke. While both the United States and the Soviet Union developed small, portable nuclear weapons during the Cold War, the actual existence and security status of these devices remain uncertain and hotly debated.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. created a portable nuclear weapon known as the Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM), a large backpack-sized device. About 300 SADMs were deployed, with U.S. Army and Marine Corps commandos trained to use them in demolition missions behind enemy lines.
Modern fears about missing suitcase nukes stem largely from a 1997 claim by former Russian national security adviser Alexander Lebed. In a 60 Minutes interview on September 7, Lebed alleged that the Russian military had lost track of over 100 out of 250 suitcase-sized nuclear bombs.
Three days later, however, the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy dismissed Lebed’s claim, stating, “We don’t know what General Lebed is talking about. No such weapons exist.” Since then, no credible evidence has surfaced to confirm the existence of these alleged lost weapons.
Experts point to the technical challenges involved. The lightest portable nukes weighed nearly 100 pounds (45 kg) and had a limited yield of just 0.19 kiloton. Producing such a weapon would require advanced engineering, ongoing maintenance, and significant financial resources. As Vahid Majidi, then-assistant director of the FBI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, put it: “No one has been able to truly identify the existence of these devices.”
In the nearly 24 years since Lebed’s claim, no Soviet-era suitcase nukes have ever been found, and no terrorist group has successfully acquired or used one, fortunately confirming the difficulty of turning Cold War-era rumors into modern threats.
As of June 23, 2025, Iran’s retaliation has followed a conventional trajectory, missile strikes on U.S. bases such as Al Udeid, renewed attacks on Israeli targets, parliamentary approval to close the Strait of Hormuz, and the activation of proxy forces like the Houthis. While Iran theoretically possesses materials for radiological weapons, the technical limitations, low effectiveness, and potential for catastrophic international backlash make such use unlikely. The Department of Homeland Security has warned of possible cyberattacks and inspired violence but reports no specific or credible radiological threat to the U.S. homeland. Going forward, Iran will likely continue its response through regional proxy warfare, cyber operations, economic pressure via the Strait of Hormuz, and missile strikes, remaining within the boundaries of conventional conflict rather than escalating to radiological or nuclear terrorism.
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